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Introduction
In the 1990s, "look and feel" will remain an important concept for
legal protection of computer software. Though functionality alone will
never be legally protected (other than in appropriate cases by patent
law), the organization and presentation of functionality as part of the
overall "look and feel" of a computer program can be protected. "Look
and feel" best describes the originality and creativity embodied in the
overall external characteristics of a computer program.
Though criticized by the defense bar, "look and feel" describes what
user interface designers and computer programmers routinely consider to
be the most important contributions they make to their end-user-oriented
software products. The term also properly describes what end-users per-
ceive through the use of such software products. We submit that "look
and feel" protection-that is, legal protection for the original, creative,
external expression presented as the user interface of a computer pro-
gram-will continue to expand in the 1990s. This expansion will be fu-
eled by software designers and programmers who continue to develop,
and by a market that continues to demand--original, creative, interactive
user interfaces that are more graphical, robust, and expressive of their
functional content.
The following article is divided into three sections. In Section I, we
summarize the key legal principles that govern legal protection of the
"look and feel" of computer software. In Section II, we describe the
historical development of important "look and feel" cases. In Section
III, we note the impact of three recent U.S. Supreme Court cases: Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,I Feist Publications v. Rural Tele-
phone Service,2 and Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. All three cases
can be expected to have major influence in the continuing development of
the law in this area. Even as federal law continues to forbid non-patent
protection for published functionality alone, we believe that the Copy-
right Act will continue to protect published functionality. Further, for
inherently distinctive displays, the Lanham Act will begin to protect the
originality and creativity contained in the overall "look and feel" of a
computer program, including the organization and presentation of user-
visible collections of functions expressed by the software author.
1. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
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I
Key Principles Summarized
From the cases described below, the following principles can be
readily ascertained and will guide the discussion that follows:
1. Competitive principles require that ideas, not patented under
federal law and not maintained as a trade secret under state law, may not
be protected and cannot be protected by copyright or trademark law.
2. What is an "idea" and what is an "expression" in particular
computer programs will continue to be determined on a case-by-case ba-
sis using the "abstractions" test, the merger doctrine, and published in-
dustry standards under the copyright scenes a faire doctrine.4
3. Original expression in the "look and feel" of computer software
is protected by copyright.5
4. After Feist, what is "original" is determined by the answer to
two questions: First, has the work been independently developed-that
is, not simply copied from another source? Second, even if independently
developed, does the work have "some" greater than de minimis level of
creativity-that is, in the words of Feist: is the work more than "garden
variety," not "so mechanical or routine as to require no creativity what-
soever," not "devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity," and not
one "in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be
virtually nonexistent"? 6
5. Original expression in the "look and feel" of computer software,
when inherently distinctive, can be additionally protected as trade dress
under the Lanham Act.' Indeed, Lanham Act protection may become
the next major vehicle for legal protection of published computer
software.
Under these principles, "look and feel" protection will extend, in
our opinion, to all originality in a computer program's user interface,
including the original expression of the selection, organization, and pres-
entation of user-visible functions,' whether in menus, graphical displays,
4. Cf Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp. 203, 216-19 (D. Mass. 1992)
(electronic spreadsheet with menus is "idea" but overall Lotus 1-2-3 menu-oriented user inter-
face is copyrighted "expression") with Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp.
1006, 1022-26 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (overall desktop metaphor of Apple Macintosh graphical user
interface is "idea" and dissection of particular elements found to be either licensed material or
unprotected ideas).
5. See Feist, III S. Ct. at 1282.
6. Id. at 1294.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
8. We agree that a single user-visible command should not be protected; however, we
disagree with Douglas Derwin's view that an entire collection of user-visible functions should
never be protected. See Mr. Derwin's article entitled It Is Time to Put "Look and Feel" Out to
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or other visual or sensory metaphors. The general principles recited
above, as well as the underlying federal statutes and the cases interpret-
ing them, all support this treatment.
II
Historical Development of "Look and Feel" Protection
A. Statutory Development
The Copyright Revision Act was enacted in 1976 and became effec-
tive on October 1, 1978.9 The Act, together with its legislative history,
confirmed copyright protection for computer software. However, the
Act itself did not set forth any particulars for the protection of computer
software. Instead, Congress designated the Commission on New Tech-
nological Uses (CONTU) to further investigate the area and to set forth
recommendations for further legislation.
In 1978, CONTU issued a report recommending additional legisla-
tion that later became the Software Copyright Act of 1980. Curiously,
the Software Copyright Act added little; it merely set forth some further
definitions and confirmed that computer programs should be accorded
copyright protection in both their source and object code form.
The Software Copyright Act of 1980 and the Copyright Revision
Act of 1976 showed the general intent of Congress to protect computer
programs; however, neither Act described explicitly whether protection
for a computer program extended beyond source and object code I0 to the
originality and creativity contained in the audiovisual displays compris-
ing the user interface or overall "look and feel" of the computer
program.
B. Initial Videogame-Based Case Law
Notwithstanding the lack of statutory guidance, a foundation for
copyright protection for "look and feel" dates back to the early 1980s
when computer game audiovisual cases were first litigated. One of the
more celebrated cases was Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Con-
Pasture, in this issue of HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. The original selection, organization, and
presentation of such commands is protected by copyright post-Feist, as is the original selection,
organization, and presentation of data. See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir.
1991).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
10. The Software Copyright Act defined "computer program" as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Such "statements or instructions" include, without question,
source code and object code for a computer program; however, interactive audiovisual displays
or "look and feel" of computer programs are not explicitly covered by this definition.
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sumer Electronics Corp."1 In Atari, one of the so-called "Pac-Man"
cases, the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court's denial of Atari's re-
quest for a preliminary injunction against the makers of another audiovi-
sual game featuring a creature called "K.C. Munchkin."12  The
copyright at issue was not claimed to be one in the underlying code, but
rather an audiovisual copyright in the screen display.
In finding that the plaintiff had met its burden of showing a reason-
able likelihood of success on the merits, the Seventh Circuit compared
the details of the audiovisual displays of the two works, finding that a
number of similarities in the Pac-Man and K.C. Munchkin "gobblers"
and "ghost monsters" were the deciding factors in Atari's favor on the
question of substantial similarity."3 While noting that there was not
identical copying, the court found that the defendant's game had cap-
tured the "total concept and feel" of Atari's game. 4 The "total concept
and feel" theory was then adopted by a number of other federal courts"5
in computer game cases. In general, copyright was extended broadly to
protect the audiovisual displays of this new entertainment medium.
C. The Birth of "Look and Feel"
The videogame cases did not answer the more difficult question of
whether copyright protection would extend to the "look and feel" of tex-
tual and graphical interfaces of non-entertainment software products,
such as word processors, spreadsheets, databases, and operating environ-
ments. The article entitled "Copyright in the 'Look and Feel' of Com-
puter Software" addressed this question.16 This article was careful to
note that functions and generic features would not be protected and that
protection would extend only to original expression presented by audio-
visual displays.' 7
"Look and feel" then took on a life of its own. The legal community
began debating, and the Copyright Office began receiving all types of re-
gistration applications seeking broader protection. Registering the "look
and feel" of all computer programs became routine. Such registration
11. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
12. Id. at 620.
13. Id. at 617-20.
14. Id. at 619-20.
15. See, e.g., Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (Simi-
larity of the expression of the idea "exists when the 'total concept and feel of the works' is
substantially similar."); Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
16. Jack Russo & Douglas K. Derwin, Copyright in the "Look and Feel" of Computer
Software, 2 COMPUTER LAW. 1 (Feb. 1985). Contrary to Doug Derwin's recent recantation,
he was fully supportive of "look and feel" as the appropriate term for describing the overall
presentation of a computer program's user interface. Id. at 11.
17. Id. at 8.
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was made either as part of the registration of the underlying object and
source code or as a separate registration of the visual displays based on
the deposit of video tapes, slides, or photographs representing sample
portions of the display.
D. The Position of the Copyright Office
The Copyright Office took a number of differing positions while the
cases discussed below were making their way through the courts. The
Office originally allowed registration of visual displays either as separate
audiovisual works or as separate literary works. The Office then changed
its position and held that the registration of the underlying program also
protected all elements of its audiovisual display.
Starting on September 9, 1987, the Copyright Office held public
hearings to obtain comments and recommendations on how it should
proceed in this area." At these hearings, three separate views emerged
as to the proper procedure to be followed in computer software registra-
tion cases. To some degree, these views also represented the conflict,
existing then and now within the industry, on the broader question of
how the Copyright Act should be interpreted in computer program
cases.
The majority view, supported by a number of industry associations,
recommended that the Copyright Office continue to allow a single regis-
tration to cover the entire work, including visual displays. 19 Under this
view, the registrant also would have the option of submitting additional
deposit material and/or an additional application for visual displays.2" A
modified version of the majority view suggested that the Copyright Office
develop a new registration form specifically designed for computer
software applications, a form that would more specifically cover registra-
tion of all aspects of the originality embodied in a computer program.
The majority position was supported by the need for a uniform Copy-
right Office practice, by the need to avoid prejudice of existing registra-
tions, and by the desire to allow for flexibility in the future.2"
A second view, supported mainly by Apple Computer, argued for
requiring separate registration applications for visual displays and the
underlying program code.22 The position was supported by the desire to
have independent registrations as evidence of independent copyright pro-
tection of subject matter (visual displays) that might exist across differing
18. 36 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 152, 153 (1988).
19. Id. at 153.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 154.
22. Id. at 153.
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computer program code and differing computer hardware.2" In this
manner, it was argued, it would be clearer if an infringement of visual
displays could occur independent of any infringement of the underlying
program code and independent of the particular computer hardware on
which the substantially similar visual displays were made to operate.
A third view, supported by some user-oriented associations, sug-
gested that the Copyright Office should not allow any registration of vis-
ual displays of computer software. They argued that such displays are
generally functional and, therefore, generally not copyrightable.
In response, the Copyright Office noted that each case must be ex-
amined separately and that Congress and the courts (not the Copyright
Office) should determine blanket rules for eligibility of subject matter for
copyright. Original works of authorship embodying expression are prop-
erly the subject matter of copyright regardless of whether such works are
presented in the form of visual displays of computer programs.
In June 1988, the Copyright Office issued a report and internal
guidelines that upheld a single registration application practice for pro-
tection of all aspects of a computer program's originality, including vis-
ual displays.24 Whether the registration application is made for literary
works or for audiovisual works turns on which aspect of the work "pre-
dominates."25 In either case, however, the applicant can submit deposit
material to support the areas in which protection is sought.26 By this
mechanism, the Copyright Office, in effect, confirmed at the examination
and registration levels, and for practical purposes even further, that
copyright protection can extend beyond the literal program code for the
computer software and to the "look and feel" of the computer software.
The three views expressed at the Copyright Office hearings roughly
correspond to the views found in the conflicting judicial opinions ad-
dressing these same issues. One body of case law provides broad protec-
tion (like Apple's position in the Copyright Office hearings); other cases
will provide only limited protection (as suggested by some of the user
associations in the Copyright Office hearings); and the most recent cases
appear to take a middle ground approach by protecting certain user in-
terface elements determined protectable on a case-by-case basis (some-
what similar to the majority view in the Copyright Office hearings). The
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet directly resolved the conflicting deci-
sions. We address each group of cases in turn below.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 155.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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E. Cases Favoring Broad Protection
A number of cases have favored broad protection of computer
software. In general, their rationale is that the "idea" of a computer
program can be stated narrowly, and everything else may be properly
considered "expression" subject to copyright protection.
1. Whelan v. Jaslow
Though not strictly a "look and feel" case, the decision in Whelan
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 27 extended the scope of copy-
right protection for computer programs and provided a foundation for a
number of later software cases.
In "elan, the Third Circuit upheld the trial court's finding of
copyright infringement based upon the defendant's copying of the "struc-
ture, sequence and organization" of the plaintiff's software.28 While rec-
ognizing that copyright protection does not extend to the "idea" or
functionality of the program, the court found that similarities in the file
structures, screen outputs, and certain subroutines, while not comprising
a majority of the total number of lines of code in defendant's software,
were similarities in "expression" and therefore constituted copyright
infringement.29
In so finding, the Whelan court set forth a test for determining the
line between unprotectable ideas and protectable expression of those
ideas-a test that favors finding protectable expression:
[T]he line between idea and expression may be drawn with reference to
the end sought to be achieved by the work in question. In other words,
the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea,
and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would
be part of the expression of the idea. 30
In applying the above rule, the Third Circuit quoted the district
court:
Different computer systems may functionally serve similar purposes
without being copies of each other. There is evidence in the record that
there are other software programs for the business management of den-
tal laboratories in competition with plaintiffs program. There is no
contention that any of them infringe although they may incorporate
many of the same ideas and functions.3'
Thus, the Whelan decision extended copyright protection beyond
the literal copying of the program code itself, to the structure, sequence,
27. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
28. Id. at 1239, 1248.
29. Id. at 1238-39.
30. Id. at 1236 (emphasis omitted).
31. Id. at 1238-39 (emphasis omitted).
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and organization of that code.32 The Whelan court also formulated a
broad test that limited unprotectable "ideas" to only those necessary to
the program's purpose or function. Everything else is or could be pro-
tectable expression.33 Computer software compatibility, ease of use, user
training, and industry standards play no obvious role in this analysis.
2 Broderbund v. Unison World
In Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,34 the district
court for the Northern District of California followed the precedent set
in Whelan of protecting the program's sequence, organization, and struc-
ture, and extended this principle to the protection of the program's visual
displays. While the plaintiff originally made a number of claims pertain-
ing to its greeting card application program called "The Print Shop,"
only the question of infringement of the audiovisual copyright in the
screen displays was tried to the court.35
In rejecting the argument that the functionality of the program dic-
tated the expression of its user interface, the district court noted that:
On the "Choose a Font" screen, no mechanical or practical factor
compelled [defendant] to use those exact words ("Choose a Font"). He
could have written, "Select a Font," or "Indicate a Typeface Prefer-
ence," or "Which Type Style Do You Prefer," or any combination of
these terms .... The bottom line is that the designer of any program
that performed the same functions as "Print Shop" had available a wide
range of expression A overned predominantly by artistic and not utilita-
rian considerations.
On the question of sufficient similarity to justify a finding of in-
fringement, the district court said: "The question is whether the infring-
ing work captures the 'total concept and feel' of the protected work."37
In finding infringement, the court stated that "[t]he ordinary observer
could hardly avoid being struck by the eerie resemblance between the
screens of the two programs. In general, the sequence of the screens and
the choices presented, the layout of the screens, and the method of feed-
back to the user are all substantially similar."38
Thus, the Broderbund court extended the holding in Whelan to au-
diovisual copyrights in computer programs beyond their literal displays.
The court also implied, without directly addressing the issue, that a sin-
32. Id. at 1248.
33. Id. at 1238-39.
34. 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
35. Id. at 1129.
36. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 1137.
38. Id.
1993]
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gle copyright in the greeting card program would protect all original as-
pects of the program.
39
3. Digital Communications v. Softklone
In Digital Communications Associates v. Softklone Distributing
Corp.," the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest had developed a telecom-
munications program, Crosstalk XVI, which allowed users of personal
computers to communicate information to other computer users through
modems.41
The defendant, Softklone Distributing Corporation (Softklone), was
created for the purpose of cloning popular software products such as
plaintiff's Crosstalk XVI.42 Softklone's idea and business plan was to
create less expensive versions of popular software using independently
written source code but having the same functions, user interface, and
overall "look and feel" as the more expensive products.43 Softklone's
first product, called "MIRROR," was designed and advertised to have
the same user interface as plaintiff's Crosstalk XVI." The justification
for this was the advice of Softklone's legal counsel that "the source and
object codes of the Crosstalk XVI computer program and the Crosstalk
XVI user manual were copyrightable, but that use of a similar or identi-
cal screen display to the Crosstalk XVI status screen would not consti-
tute copyright infringement because the status screen was not
copyrightable."'45
The district court in Digital Communications first acknowledged
Whelan, holding that copyright protection can extend to non-literal as-
pects of the program.46 The court declined, however, to embrace the
argument that the copyright protection subsisting in the underlying pro-
gram also extended to the visual display of that program, finding instead
that these two aspects constituted separate works of authorship and
therefore required two separate copyright registrations.
Most importantly, the court found that the status screen,48 even
though only a single display of a number of parameters and commands,
was protectable expression and was copyrightable as an arrangement and
39. Id. at 1135.
40. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
41. Id. at 452.
42. Id. at 453.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 455.
47. Id. at 455-56.
48. A copy of the status screen appears in the District Court's decision at 659 F. Supp. at
465-66.
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compilation of such information independent of its underlying program
code.49 The court noted but distinguished Synercom Technology v. Uni-
versity Computing5' (the same case later embraced by the Fifth Circuit):
It appears that the [Synercom] court concluded that the idea of the
format cards, i.e., a particular sequence of data, had merged with the
expression of the format cards, i.e., the sequence of .the format card
.... That is, the idea of the sequence of data necessitated a particular
expression of that sequence on the format cards. To the court, the
format cards evidenced no stylistic creativity above and beyond the
sequence of data.
In the instant case, however, the arrangement of the status screen
involves considerable stylistic creativity and authorship above and be-
yond the ideas embodied in the status screen. It cannot be said that
the idea of the status screen, i.e., using two symbol commands to
change the operations of the computer program and reflecting that fact
on a screen listing the computer program's parameters/commands
with their operative values, could not have been expressed in a large
variety of ways. The defendants have never contended that they could
not have arranged the parameters/commands in a wide variety of pat-
terns without hampering the operation of their program. The parame-
ters/commands could have been arranged and delineated in an almost
infinite number of horizontal and vertical patterns and groupings that
would be substantially dissimilar to the arrangement and grouping uti-
lized by plaintiff. Likewise, the defendants could have used a wide
variety of techniques to indicate which symbols the user should type to
effectuate a command, e.g., different symbols could have been chosen,
or simply highlighting, or capitalizing, or underlining the appropriate
symbols, or any combination thereof, or placement of the symbols in
parenthesis or brackets before or after the parameter/command. The
modes of expression chosen by the plaintiff for its status screen are
clearly not necessary to the idea of the status screen. Therefore the
plaintiff's mode of expression of the status screen does not merge with
the idea of the status screen. 5
Thus, Digital Communications stands for the proposition that static
visual displays of computer programs, even though entirely textual in
nature, can be protected by copyright even if all of a defendant's underly-
ing program code is original and not substantially similar to the plain-
tiffs program code. The court's decision required, however, that a
copyright registration separate from that on the underlying program
code be obtained for the visual displays of the program-a requirement
in direct conflict with the then-existing and still current practice within
the Copyright Office.
49. Id. at 463.
50. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987).
51. Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 460.
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4. Lotus v. Paperback; Lotus v. Mosaic
In January, 1987, Lotus Development filed suits against Paperback
Software52 and Mosaic Software53 claiming that each defendant had de-
veloped an infringing "clone" of the now famous Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet
software.5
4
Mosaic Software, Inc. (Mosaic) designed, developed, and marketed
a spreadsheet software product called the "Twin," along with several
other related software products. The name "Twin" is not coincidental,
because the product was designed to work like Lotus 1-2-3. Mosaic's
advertising even proclaimed that the "Twin" software product "offers
you so much more, for so much less."
Paperback Software International (Paperback) published a spread-
sheet software product called "VP-Planner." Though the name did not
suggest it, the packaging for the product made clear that the product
"has everything 1-2-3 has . . . with more features and with more
functions."
While both Mosaic's Twin and Paperback's VP-Planner had most of
the same features, commands, macro language, syntax, organization, and
sequence of menus and messages as Lotus 1-2-3, their visual displays
were not identical to 1-2-3 or to each other. Both Twin and VP-Planner
reorganized and placed their respective menus, sub-menus, prompts, and
messages on the bottom of the screen.
Paperback differentiated itself further by adding function numbers
and letters in front of certain commands, and Mosaic added an indicator
of the internal memory amount available to the user. Both products
could, however, read Lotus files without modification, including Lotus
macro files, and the Lotus user would find much familiarity in the overall
"look and feel" of these products.
Lotus' complaints against Mosaic and Paperback both pleaded three
claims: copyright infringement, false and misleading advertising, and un-
fair competition. Both actions sought injunctive relief, seizure, impound-
52. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). A
critique of this case is found in Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976. A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1992).
53. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Mosaic Software, Inc., No. 87-74-K (D. Mass. filed Jan. 22,
1991).
54. In a related matter, Software Arts, the developer of the original VisiCalc spreadsheet
software, filed a separate action against Lotus claiming that Lotus 1-2-3 was an infringement of
VisiCalc. It further contended that such infringement claims could be brought by Software
Arts even though Software Arts had conveyed all rights, title, and interest in the VisiCalc
computer program copyrights to Lotus in an earlier business transaction. The district court
granted Lotus' motion dismissing Software Arts' action and confirming that Lotus had ac-
quired all rights, including all claims, as part of the transaction.
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ment, recovery of profits, actual or statutory damages, punitive damages
of at least $10,000,000, and reimbursement for attorneys' fees and costs.
Both complaints charged that each product "is copied from, and is
substantially similar or identical to":
the organization, structure and sequence of 1-2-3
the instructions, command and menu language of 1-2-3
the macro commands and syntax of 1-2-3
the organizational and structural expressions of 1-2-3
the visual displays and screen images of 1-2-3
the content and format of video displays of 1-2-3
the sequence of the video displays of 1-2-3
the displayed instructions and language of 1-2-3
On June 28, 1990, the federal district court in Boston entered a 110-
page decision upholding Lotus' copyright in the user interface of Lotus
1-2-3." The court ruled that:
This particular expression of a menu structure is not essential to the
electronic spreadsheet idea, nor does it merge with the somewhat less
abstract idea of a menu structure for an electronic spreadsheet....
[T]he overall structure, the order of commands in each menu line, the
choice of letters, words, or "symbolic tokens" to represent each com-
mand, the presentation of these symbolic tokens on the screen .... the
type of menu system used .... and the long prompts ... could be
expressed in a great many if not literally unlimited number of ways.5 6
The opinion provided a primer on computer law and copyright law
and a detailed, three-part legal test for copyrightability of the nonliteral
elements of a computer program:
a. Scale of Abstractions
FIRST, in making the determination of "copyrightability," the deci-
sion maker must focus upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or
the court may conceive, along the scale from the most generalized con-
ception to the most particularized, and choose some formulation-some
conception or definition of the "idea"-for the purpose of distinguish-
ing between the idea and its expression.57
This first step may be called extrapolating a "Scale of Abstractions."
The court considers, in effect, how broad or how narrow copyright pro-
tection could be in a particular case. This is required in copyright cases
because, unlike patents, there are no written claims in copyright registra-
tion applications or in issued copyright registration certificates.
55. Paperback Software, 740 F. Supp. at 37.
56. Id. at 67.
57. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
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b. Essential Elements of the Idea
The court then went on to explain how the fact-finder should at-
tempt to distinguish idea from expression:
SECOND, the decision maker must focus upon whether an alleged
expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of
that idea (or is one of only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead
includes identifiable elements of expression not essential to every ex-
pression of that idea.58
This second step may be called determining the "Essential Elements
of an Idea." In practice, the court reviews other software products in the
same field to determine those shared elements that, in effect, define the
particular product area. In Lotus v. Paperback, the court noted that
most electronic spreadsheet programs include rows, columns, cells, com-
mand menus, messages, and macro languages as essential elements of the
idea of an electronic spreadsheet, but the exact manner of expressing the
menus, messages, and language differs among the various products.
c. Substantiality of Expression
Finally, the court set forth the last step of the analysis, which in-
volves evaluating the resulting product:
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every
expression of the idea, the decision maker must focus on whether those
elements are a substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable
"work. , ,59
This third step requires judging whether particular elements individ-
ually or, more importantly, when taken as a whole, are not so trivial that
sufficient originality exists to merit copyright protection. For example,
and as found by the court, each command word in the Lotus macro lan-
guage is not substantial enough to protect individually, but the command
language, as a whole, is protected:
The fact that some of these specific command terms are quite obvious
or merge with the idea of such a particular command term does not
preclude copyrightability for the command structure taken as a whole.
If particular characteristics not distinctive individually have been
brought together in a way that makes the "whole" a distinctive expres-
sion of an idea-one of many possible ways of expressing it-then the
"whole" may be copyrightable. 60
The Lotus v. Paperback decision clearly confirmed a policy of broad
copyright protection for computer software in all of its various forms of
originality. More importantly, the district court's decision opened the
58. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 67.
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door to further expansion of copyright or voice, audio, and other non-
traditional forms of user interfaces.
In theory, other forms of sensory perception, if original and if
"fixed" in some form of expression, can be protected by copyright if "the
overall structure, the order of commands . . . , the choice of letters,
words, or 'symbolic tokens' to represent each command.. .. " and other
features may be expressed in a number of other ways. s" Under the above
line of cases, copyright is extended broadly without an overly strong con-
cern for competitive principles.
F. Cases Favoring Competitive Principles
A number of cases took a more competitive approach in determin-
ing what is copyrightable "expression" in computer software cases. We
discuss these cases below.
1. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing
In Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co. ,62 the
court issued an early potential blow to copyright protection of visual dis-
plays-even though the case itself did not deal with the subject of visual
displays. Rather, the court was faced with the question of whether the
plaintiff's sequencing of data input formats for a statistical analysis pro-
gram could be protected by copyright.63
The Synercom court rejected the plaintiff's position and held that
the sequence and ordering of data input was unprotected idea. In dicta,
the court stated that a further ground for finding no copyright protection
was that the plaintiff's input formats were blank forms whose idea had
merged into its expression."
The Synercom court analogized the sequence and ordering of the
plaintiff's data input formats to the familiar "H" shift pattern used in
manual transmission automobiles. 65 The court reasoned that another au-
tomobile maker would be free to create another car using the same "pat-
tern," and to allow such copying is "socially desirable" even though
"[a]dmittedly, there are many more possible choices of computer for-
mats, . . . but this does not detract from the force of the analogy." 66
For the Synercom court it was enough that the input formats repre-
sented a barrier to third parties who wished to have their programs use
61. Id.
62. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
63. Id. at 1004.
64. Id. at 1013-14.
65. Id. at 1013.
66. Id.
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data that had already been formatted for the plaintiff's program. Ac-
cordingly, the court gave priority to compatibility and competition.
Taken to its limits, the rationale in Synercom would prevent the use of
copyright whenever competitors need third-party information (such as
compatible screen displays) to take advantage of an installed base of
users and user training. This is one of the most critical issues in recent
litigation.
2. Plains Cotton v. Goodpasture Computer
In Plains Cotton Cooperative Association v. Goodpasture Computer
Service, Inc. ,67 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction that plaintiff sought for the purpose of enjoining
''organizational copying," which defendants had submitted were due to
the methods of the cotton industry for which the program was designed.
In Plains Cotton, the plaintiff, an agricultural cooperative, had de-
veloped computer software called the "Telcot system."68 The Telcot
system operated on a mainframe computer and, through telecommunica-
tions, permitted cooperative members to obtain regularly updated dis-
plays of information pertaining to cotton prices and availability, as well
as accounting and order processing services.69 The individual defendants
had worked on the development of the Telcot system for the plaintiff but
"[n]one of these employees was required to sign confidentiality agree-
ments as a condition of his employment with Plains."70
The individual defendants left Plains and went to work for a com-
pany called CXS.71 Plains and CXS had previously entered an agree-
ment whereby CXS was licensed to create a personal computer version of
the Telcot system with both parties becoming joint owners of the result-
ing work. When the individual defendants left to join CXS, Plains
sought to terminate the licensing arrangement. 72 Thereafter, CXS be-
came insolvent and filed for bankruptcy.7 a Apparently, while CXS was
bankrupt, Plains and CXS reached an agreement regarding termination
and regarding Plains' option to purchase all rights in the software that
had been created up until that time. Plains did not exercise this option.74
The corporate defendant, Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc.
(Goodpasture) hired the individual defendants after CXS filed for bank-
67. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 1258.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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ruptcy and put them to work on the personal computer version of the
Telcot system. Just twenty days after arriving at Goodpasture, the for-
mer Plains employees had completed a design of the personal computer
version of the Telcot system. Several months later, Goodpasture began
marketing the system under the name "Gems." 75
The district court found that: the four former Plains employees had
access to the Telcot system; one of them had brought to Goodpasture a
diskette containing Telcot system programming design information; and
at least one Telcot subroutine had been copied into and as part of the
programming for Gems. Nevertheless, the district court refused to enter
a preliminary injunction, finding that the underlying program code for
the two programs had not been copied (with the exception of the one
subroutine, which had been replaced by the date of the preliminary in-
junction hearing). The Fifth Circuit affirmed and made clear that it was
not prepared to embrace a broad scope of protection for software
copyrights:
The legal finding by the district court ultimately rests on a judg-
ment about the extent of the protection offered by appellant's copy-
right. On that issue, we look to our colleague Judge Higginbotham's
opinion in Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co. In that
case, Judge Higginbotham held that "input formats" of a computer
program-the organization and configuration of the information fed to
the computer-were ideas, not expressions, and thus were not pro-
tected by copyright.
To the extent that input formats represent a level of computer
software design more specific than functional design and more general
than line-by-line program design, the issue of their copyrightability is
relevant to the issue of whether GEMS infringes on protected Telcot
designs. Appellant urges that we adopt the reasoning of Whelan Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., which is admittedly "at
odds with Judge Higginbotham's scholarly opinion." Whelan rejects
the premise developed in Synercom that "there [is] a difference be-
tween the copyrightability of sequence and form in the computer con-
text and in any other context," holding that the structure, sequence,
and organization of computer programs are copyrightable.
We decline to embrace Whelan for two reasons. First, the issue is
presented to us on review of a denial of a motion for preliminary in-
junction. Thus, the record is only partially developed, and our review
is one step removed from the actual merits of the case. Second, appel-
lees presented evidence that many of the similarities between the
GEMS and Telcot programs are dictated by the externalities of the
cotton market. To that extent, the facts of this case fit squarely within
Synercom's powerful analogy to the hypothetical development of gear
stick patterns. The record supports the inference that market factors
play a significant role in determining the sequence and organization of
75. Id. at 1259.
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cotton marketing software, and we decline to hold that those patterns
cannot constitute "ideas" in a computer context.76
In a footnote further explaining the phrase "externalities of the cot-
ton market" that "play a significant role in determining the sequence and
organization of cotton marketing software," the Fifth Circuit stated:
For example, appellees' witnesses testified that their cotton marketing
program was designed to present the same information as is contained
on a cotton recap sheet, within the confines imposed by use of a com-
puter. By contrast, appellant's expert witness admitted on cross-exam-
ination that he had no knowledge of the cotton industry and had never
seen a cotton recap sheet, and thus could not comment on whether the
similarity between GEMS and Telcot arises from the attempt of both
programs to convey the same standardized information to the user.7 7
The Fifth Circuit thus concluded that Plains Cotton had failed to
demonstrate that the district court's factual findings were clearly errone-
ous or that its findings of law were incorrect. 78 This decision was the first
officially reported post- Whelan appellate decision not to find or affirm an
infringement based on less than a literal copying of underlying program
code.
While finding that defendant's program was "very similar to Telcot
on the functional specification, programming and documentation
levels,"'79 the court refused to follow Whelan and instead held that at that
early stage of litigation, where no adjudication had yet occurred, the
structure, sequence, and organization of the plaintiff's program was not
necessarily expression but could, as a factual matter, be found after trial
to constitute an unprotectable "idea." 8
Thus, the Fifth Circuit suggested that whether structure, sequence,
or organization of a computer program is protected expression or unpro-
tectable idea must be determined factually on a case-by-case basis. This
determination is made by looking at the computer program in the con-
text of the particular industry in which it is employed and deciding
whether the custom and practice of that industry demand that the visual
displays of such programs be organized in a certain manner because of
the custom and practice of the particular industry in which the computer
program is designed to operate.
Similar to Synercom, the holding in Plains Cotton lends support to
the argument that software compatibility, ease of use, user training, and
industry standards play important roles in determining whether copy-
76. Id. at 1262 (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 1262 n.4.
78. Id. at 1262.
79. Id. at 1259.
80. Id. at 1262.
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right will attach to a particular program and, if so, the scope of copyright
protection which will be afforded the particular program.
3. Data East USA v. Epyx
In Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc. ,"1 the Ninth Circuit reversed a
finding of copyright infringement by the district court and held that the
similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's respective "Karate"
video games were dictated by the functions of the game and not by their
expression. The Ninth Circuit stated that:
After careful consideration and viewing of these features, we find that
they necessarily follow from the idea of a martial arts karate combat
game, or are inseparable from, indispensable to, or even standard treat-
ment of the idea of the karate sport. As such, they are not protectable.
"When idea and expression coincide, there will be protection against
nothing other than identical copying." A comparison of the works in
this case demonstrates that identical copying is not an issue.
Accordingly, we hold that the court did not give the appropriate
weight and import to its findings which support Epyx's argument that
the similarities result from unprotectable expression ....
The lower court erred by not limiting the scope of Data East's
copyright protection to the author's contribution-the scoreboard and
background scenes. In actuality, however, the backgrounds are quite
dissimilar and the method of scorekeeping, though similar, is
inconsequential. 2
The Ninth Circuit's decision is important for a number of reasons.
First, it demonstrates that what is "idea" and what is "expression" is
determined on a case-by-case basis with no assurance or certainty of out-
come. Second, when the evidence of two competing works is reviewable
without reference to testimony, the Ninth Circuit will review it and may
reverse opposing factual findings of the district court. Third, in the
Ninth Circuit's view, even "thin" copyrights-where expression is close
to idea-are protected against identical copying.
G. Cases Taking an Analytic (Screen-by-Screen) Approach
Recent cases have taken a more analytic approach in determining
which audiovisual expression is protected on an element-by-element or
screen-by-screen basis. This approach correctly discerns those screens
and the elements of those screens that are disqualified from copyright
protection by the doctrines of functionality, merger, scenes a faire, lack of
creativity, or lack of originality. However, in the course of analytic dis-
section, courts may fail to appreciate the overall originality and creativity
81. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
82. Id. at 209 (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1168 (9th Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added).
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existing in the selection, organization, and presentation of the collection
of even public domain screens, or public domain elements on particular
screens, or the creative sequencing of such screens from one to another.
1. Manufacturers Technologies v. CAMS
In Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc.,"a the district
court analyzed the copyright protection that extended to a cost estimat-
ing computer program called the "COSTIMATOR." The program con-
tained a series of screens that allowed the user to input the information
necessary to generate a cost estimate. The defendants, three of whom
had acted as the plaintiff's sales representatives for the COSTIMATOR
program, began developing a functionally similar program to sell for
$1,000 to $2,500 (as compared to the $20,000 price for plaintiff's pro-
gram)., 4 The plaintiff brought suit for, among other things, copyright
infringement based on the similarity of the screen displays in the defend-
ants' software.
s5
The district court found copyrightability in the screen displays alone
without regard to the underlying program code and held that the defend-
ants had infringed the visual display copyrights. The district court relied
upon the Copyright Office's decision and stated:
Whether a copyright in a computer program extends to its screen dis-
plays has been the subject of some confusion and disagreement. Part
of this confusion was relieved by a recent decision of the Copyright
Office which stated that a single copyright registration of a computer
program extends copyright protection not only to the literal elements
of the program-its source and object codes-but also to the screen
displays it generates to the extent that they contain original creative
authorship. 
6
The district court went on to review the Whelan, Broderbund, and
Digital Communications decisions 7 and to hold that:
The Court could require the plaintiff to prove infringement of the pro-
gram copyrights themselves by showing not only substantial similarity
between the computer screen displays but also by showing substantial
similarity in the program codes (or by showing that the portion of the
program coding represented by the screen outputs was such a qualita-
tive part of the program itself that the program was infringed). The
downfall of such an approach is that if, in fact, the infringing party
only reverse engineered the screen displays themselves without having
had access to the source or object codes, then the plaintiff's task in
showing infringement of the computer program itself would be diffi-
cult, if not insurmountable. Such an approach would afford little, if
83. 706 F. Supp. 984, 988 (D. Conn. 1989).
84. Id. at 989-90.
85. Id. at 990.
86. Id. at 990-91 (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 992.
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any, protection to the expression that may be encompassed within the
user interface or screen displays of a program."8
Using the above reasoning, the district court in CAMS treated the
copyright registration of the computer program as protecting the under-
lying program code as well as the visual display. As a result, the court
found that, though the underlying computer program may not have been
copied, the defendants' access to and the similarity of defendants' prod-
uct to the screen displays of plaintiff's program were sufficient to support
a finding of infringement (though the court did note those areas in which
the similarities were not sufficient to prove infringement).89
Significantly, the court in CAMS rejected the defendants' argument
that the "external flow and sequencing of the screens [for a cost-estimat-
ing program] is dictated by functional considerations." 90 The court
pointed to evidence of four different cost estimating programs that all
accomplished the same cost-estimating functions without using similar
screen displays or sequences of displays. 91 The district court concluded
that the similarities between the visual displays and the sequence of vis-
ual displays constituted an infringement even though there was "no evi-
dence that the defendants had access to the plaintiff's source code nor did
plaintiff put forth any evidence of source or object code similarity." '92
2. Apple v. Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard
On March 17, 1988, Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple) filed suit in the
federal district court in San Jose, California, against Microsoft Corpora-
tion (Microsoft) and Hewlett-Packard Company (H-P). 93 Apple claimed
that both versions 2.03 of Microsoft's Windows operating environment
computer software and H-P's New Wave desktop computer software,
which operates with Windows, infringed the audiovisual copyrights in
Apple's Macintosh visual displays and images.
Since the introduction of the Apple Lisa personal computer in 1983,
the Macintosh "desktop metaphor" has become a hallmark of Apple's
approach to non-educational (non-Apple II) personal computers. The
desktop metaphor embodied in the Macintosh personal computer ad-
vanced the work originally developed by Xerox in the sophisticated
"Xerox Star" personal computer. Xerox never successfully marketed the
Star and has since exited the hardware side of the personal computer
marketplace.
88. Id. at 993.
89. Id. at 1002.
90. Id. at 994.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1000 (footnote omitted).
93. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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Apple has been quite successful with the Macintosh. It has also
been quite successful in having the Copyright Office register the Macin-
tosh desktop and application software visual displays as audiovisual
works and the Macintosh program code as literary works. The registra-
tion certificates attached to Apple's complaint showed that Apple at-
tempted to register all aspects of authorship embodied in the Macintosh
computer programs including their audiovisual displays.
In 1985, Apple first tested the strength of its Macintosh copyrights
in a matter that was never litigated. Digital Research, Inc. (DRI) had
introduced a desktop environment called "GEM" that was similar to the
Macintosh. Apple's threat of litigation resulted in an agreement between
Apple and DRI. The exact terms of the settlement were never made
public, but it is clear that DRI acknowledged the substantial risk of ad-
verse results. DRI still markets the GEM windowing software environ-
ment, although to some degree, it has been supplanted by Microsoft's
introduction of its "Windows" environment for IBM and IBM-compati-
ble computers.
Like its case against DRI, Apple's case against Microsoft and Hew-
lett-Packard claimed infringement of its graphic user interface. In an
early decision, the district court found that certain screen displays were
licensed by Apple to Microsoft under the terms of a written non-exclu-
sive license "to use these derivative works in present and future software
programs. 94
In the litigation, Microsoft acknowledged that certain visual dis-
plays in its Windows operating environment were licensed from Apple
and "are derivative works of the visual displays generated by Apple's
Lisa and Macintosh graphic user interface programs."95 Upon the
court's finding that the license agreement extended beyond a single ver-
sion of Windows, a large number of screen displays and elements con-
tained therein that might otherwise have been the subject of the
copyright infringement action were removed from the controversy by
summary judgment in Microsoft's favor (with regard to the licensing
issue).96
Notwithstanding the adverse determination on the license issue, Ap-
ple submitted a list of 189 alleged similarities in categories such as:
1. design and appearance of application windows;
2. design and appearance of dialog boxes;
94. Id. at 928 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). This license agreement was the sub-
ject of intense license negotiations between Apple and Microsoft at a time when Apple was in
need of additional software applications from Microsoft. The negotiations are described by
John Sculley in his 1987 autobiography entitled Odyssey.
95. Apple Computer, 709 F. Supp. at 927.
96. Id. at 931-32.
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3. menu design and appearance;
4. design and appearance of individual applications;
5. icon design, appearance, and manipulation; and
6. arrangement and manipulation of application windows.
In discussing the problem of separating idea and expression, the
court noted the "metaphysical line drawing between idea and expression
by which courts rationalize their decisions." '97 Further, the court ini-
tially accepted Apple's argument in favor of the overall "look and feel"
protection for the Macintosh user interface:
Accordingly, the court concludes that even if elements are found "un-
protectable," they should not be eliminated from the substantial simi-
larity of expression analysis. Instead, if it is determined that the
defendant used the unprotectable elements in an arrangement which is
not substantially similar to the plaintiff's work, then no copyright in-
fringement can be found. If, on the other hand, the works are deemed
substantially similar, then copyright infringement will be established
even though the copyrighted work is composed of unprotectable ele-
ments. There is simply no other logical way of protecting an innova-
tive arrangement or "look and feel" of certain works. 98
Upon reconsideration, the district court ultimately rejected Apple's
approach, stating:
The claimed unifying idea of the Lisa and Macintosh works is an inter-
face suggestive of an office environment with a desktop background,
implementing through animated graphical images and fanciful symbols
what has been referred to as a "desktop metaphor" ....
To the extent the individual features of the Macintosh interface are
licensed or are unprotectible they are together, or in conjunction with
the protectible features, claimed as a copyrightable arrangement-a
"look and feel" which constitutes protectable expression apart from its
individual elements.
[I]f "desktop metaphor" is to have any meaning in the context of a
traditional copyright analysis, it should serve merely as a label for that
group of "ideas" embodied in the Macintosh interface devoted to utili-
tarian uses of that computer, or as a shorthand way of describing the
purpose or object of the panoply of ideas of multiple windows, iconic
representation and manipulation, menus and object opening and clos-
ing functions to assist computer users in operation of their machines.
"Desktop metaphor" does not describe the single unifying idea of the
Macintosh interface, but is simply another name for the type of inter-
face used on the Macintosh and is by no means exclusive to it.99
The court has narrowed the case considerably. Through a series of
rulings on motions for summary judgment, the court has ruled that Ap-
97. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 779 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
98. Id. at 136.
99. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006, 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (citations omitted).
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pie's Macintosh interface is primarily a compilation consisting of unpro-
tectable elements and is therefore subject to the "virtual identity
standard." Thus, the scope of Apple's suit was reduced from the 189
alleged similarities to only three features potentially infringed by
Microsoft's Windows and six features potentially infringed by Hewlett-
Packard's New Wave.
Of these, in total, nine alleged similarities, the court has required
Apple to prove that the expression associated with four of the remaining
features is "substantially similar" in the alleged infringing products and
that the expression associated with five of the remaining features is "vir-
tually identical" in the alleged infringing products.
3. Lotus v. Borland
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International,"° the court
applied the principles enunciated in Lotus v. Paperback to Lotus' conten-
tion that Borland's Quattro and Quattro Pro programs infringe its Lotus
1-2-3 spreadsheet program by copying Lotus 1-2-3's menu commands,
menu structure, long prompts, and keystroke sequences.10 ,
Unlike the Paperback V-P Planner and Mosaic Twin products, Bor-
land's Quattro programs had several interfaces. The "native" interface
was a different interface than Lotus 1-2-3.102 However, the Quattro pro-
grams also had an interface available to users called its "1-2-3 interface"
or "emulation interface."
To create the emulation interface, "Borland employees reviewed
books about 1-2-3 ... written by third-parties, which books contain sche-
matic or menu-tree type representations of the [Lotus] 1-2-3 menu com-
mand hierarchy."1 °3 They used these hierarchies to construct Quattro
programs that copied the relationships (though, Borland contends, not
the overall presentation) of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu hierarchy."° The dis-
trict court held that "[i]t is not enough for a plaintiff to prove great simi-
larity of the allegedly infringing work to uncopyrightable parts of the
copyrighted work."1 5
However, the district court denied Borland's motion for summary
judgment and granted, in part, Lotus' motion for summary judgment,
finding that:
100. 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992).
101. Id. at 205.
102. Id. at 206.
103. Id. at 208.
104. Id.
105. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, 788 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D. Mass. 1992).
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1. "Lotus acknowledges that any elements of its program that
were functionally dictated are not copyrightable." 106
2. "[T]he fact that a form of expression takes on functional charac-
ter does not remove it from the protection of copyright." '°
3. The "scale of abstractions" available to describe the "idea" of
the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface varies from most general to most specific as
follows:
(a) an electronic spreadsheet to
(b) a menu-driven electronic spreadsheet to
(c) a hierarchical menu-driven electronic spreadsheet to
(d) a hierarchical menu-driven electronic spreadsheet whose com-
mands are all accessible through the paths of the menu command hier-
archy to
(e) the most specific implementation by Lotus in Lotus 1-2-3 of such a
hierarchical command-driven interface.10 8
The court accepted the approach described in paragraph (d) above as the
correct statement of the "idea," thus leaving the actual implementation
of Lotus 1-2-3 as potentially copyrightable "expression" in the Lotus 1-2-
3 interface.
4. "The admitted fact that the Quattro programs duplicate the set
of 'functional relationships' of Lotus 1-2-3 and were designed to do so is
conclusive against Borland on the issue of copying that set of functional
relationships. Thus, Borland has admitted that it intentionally incorpo-
rated into its user interface the 1-2-3 menu commands and menu com-
mand hierarchy."' 1 9
5. "Borland did not obtain the right to expressive aspects of Lotus'
command hierarchy merely because-if it be the case-the 1-2-3 pro-
gram revolutionized the spreadsheet market."' 1 °
6. "[T]he menu commands and the menu command hierarchy
look the same in both programs .... The emulation interfaces are sub-
stantially similar in the mixed law-fact sense to the Lotus 1-2-3 user in-
terface (Returning to the metaphor, one may say that is why they 'feel'
the same.)." "I
Notwithstanding the above findings, the district court has ordered a
jury trial:
because the scope of relief available will depend in part on whether the
jury finds for Lotus on disputed factual contentions that the copying of
separable expressive elements of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface into the
106. Lotus Dev. Corp., 799 F. Supp. at 210 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 213 (citations omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 208.
110. Id. at 214.
111. Id. at 220-21.
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Quattro programs was greater than the minimum essential to consti-
tuting a substantial part of the Lotus 1-2-3 work.1 12
In effect, the district court has determined copyrightability, has re-
jected defenses to the same, and has left to the jury the question of
whether the degree of incorporation of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu commands
and menu command hierarchy is a substantial enough taking of a com-
peting work to constitute an infringement. Under this approach, Bor-
land can submit the evidence of the importance of software
compatibility, ease of use, user training, and industry standards for eval-
uating the alleged infringement.
4. Brown Bag v. Symantec
In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 1 3 the Ninth Circuit up-
held a summary judgment granted by the district court against a plaintiff
seeking protection of the user interface of an outlining software product.
In the late 1970s, Dave Winer originated outlining computer software for
personal computers. His company, Living Videotext, developed prod-
ucts called ThinkTank (for the IBM PC) and MORE (for the Apple
Macintosh). 4 These products automate outlining through use of a per-
sonal computer. After Living Videotext released ThinkTank and
MORE, John Friend developed for Brown Bag a clone-like competitive
product (originally marketed as shareware) called PC-Outline. For a
number of reasons, Living Videotext did not pursue an infringement
claim against John Friend or against Brown Bag.
Living Videotext ultimately merged into Symantec, and Symantec
marketed both ThinkTank and MORE. After the merger, Symantec
hired John Friend to revise ThinkTank and MORE to the next level of
innovation for an outlining product. John Friend ultimately developed
an advanced outlining program called Grandview for Symantec. 1'5 After
Grandview was released (and just before Symantec's initial public offer-
ing), Brown Bag filed suit in federal district court claiming copyright and
trade dress infringement of PC-Outline by Symantec's Grandview
software product." 6
Citing evidentiary deficiencies, license defenses, and lack of similar-
ity, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Symantec
on the copyright claims.' The district court's opinion did not address
112. Id. at 223.
113. 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992).
114. Id. at 1468.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1469.
117. Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991 (N.D. Cal.
1989).
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the Lanham Act trade dress issues11" The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling on the copyright claims but remanded the action
for the district court's clarification of its ruling on the Lanham Act
claims. '19
The Ninth Circuit's approach expressly affirms detailed analytical
dissection of the copyrightable expression from uncopyrightable features
embodied in the user interface:
In particular, the extrinsic test for literary works requires analytical
dissection of several "objective components of expression," within a
literary work such as plot, theme, characters, and dialogue. Similarity
of these objective components in two literary works logically gives rise
to a triable issue of similarity. Likewise, computer programs are sub-
ject to [an] analytic dissection of various components, e.g., screens,
menus, and keystrokes. Because the district court found that Brown
Bag made no showing of similarity along these lines with regard to
copyrighted comgonents of PC-Outline, summary judgment was not
precluded ....
The Ninth Circuit rejected Brown Bag's position that the overall
"look and feel" of the programs at issue had to be compared and evalu-
ated because "the record fails to include any evidence indicating that
Brown Bag requested the district court to make this analysis." ' More
importantly, however, the Ninth Circuit noted that:
[t]he degree to which unprotected or unprotectable features must be
eliminated from a comparison of two works is difficult to say.
Although copyright protection is not afforded to certain elements of a
work, such limitations "must not obscure the general proposition that
copyright may inhere, under appropriate circumstances, in the selection
and arrangement of unprotected components.122
We submit that the Ninth Circuit's decision correctly states the
proper approach: while analytical dissection can and should be used to
evaluate infringement claims in computer software cases, the court must
still consider the overall "look and feel" of the user interface and evalu-
ate whether the selection, arrangement, and presentation of the user in-
terface is original, is at least minimally creative, and is copied in whole or
in substantial part-even if such selection, arrangement, and presenta-
tion is of commands and other functional features which, on their own,
are not individually or separately protectable.
118. Brown Bag Software, 960 F.2d at 1477.
119. Id. at 1478.
120. Id. at 1477 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 1476.
122. Id. at 1476 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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III
Supreme Court Developments
How would the U.S. Supreme Court decide "look and feel" protec-
tion for computer software? In the last three years, the Court has de-
cided three cases of importance to computer lawyers: Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,12 3 Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Ser-
vice,"' and Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 2 ' Although these cases
do not directly address protection of computer software user interfaces,
their holdings will be critical to the further definition of legal protection
for computer software, including protection of audiovisual user
interfaces.
A. Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,' 26 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a Florida statute protecting boat hull designers
from reverse-engineering of their boat hulls conflicted with federal patent
law and was therefore preempted by the Supremacy Clause. 27
In Bonito Boats, no patent application had been filed on the design
or manufacturing process used by Bonito Boats. When the Florida legis-
lature enacted a statute prohibiting use of the direct molding process to
duplicate unpatented boat hulls and forbidding knowing sales of hulls so
duplicated, the Bonito Boats hull model in question had already been on
the market for six years.
In its opinion, the Court held that the Florida statute offered patent-
like protection to ideas that were unprotected under federal patent
law.'2 ' In offering protection to ideas that were unpatentable, the Flor-
ida statute restricted the public's ability to exploit unpatented designs
and conflicted with the strong public policy favoring free competition in
ideas that do not merit patent protection.' 29 The Court stated: "From
their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance
between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imita-
tion and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention
itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.' ' a°
123. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
124. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
125. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
126. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
127. Id. at 167-68.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 146.
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The Florida statute conflicted with several principles of federal pat-
ent law. First, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and (b) "exclude from consideration
for patent protection knowledge ... already available to the public."' 131
Because the boat hulls in question had been sold for six years, they were
indisputably already available to the public.
Second, along with requirements of novelty and utility, there is a
"nonobviousness requirement [that] extends the field of unpatentable ma-
terial beyond that which is known to the public under § 102, to include
that which could readily be deduced from publicly available material by
a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent field of endeavor."' 132
Bonito Boats emphasizes the Court's unwillingness to allow non-pat-
ent protection for published functionality:
Congress has considered extending various forms of limited protection
to industrial design either through the copyright laws or by relaxing
the restrictions on the availability of design patents. Congress explic-
itly refused to take this step in the copyright laws and despite sustained
criticism for a number of years, it has declined to alter the patent pro-
tections presently available for industrial design.1 33
Under Bonito Boats, all published, unpatented functionality is in the
public domain and is available to all for use in future works. Competitive
principles require this result. Such competitive principles aid authors of
future works.
B. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service
In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,134 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a publishing company that copied less than
1,500 name, address, and telephone number listings from the white pages
of a telephone book was not guilty of copyright infringement. The Court
emphasized that the individual listings were uncopyrightable facts and
that the telephone company had not selected, coordinated, or arranged
the facts in an original way sufficient to satisfy minimum copyright
requirements. 135
Rural Telephone Service was the sole provider of telephone service
in its service area. As a telephone company operating in Kansas, it was
required by the State of Kansas to collect and publish telephone listing
information in an annual directory. The white pages of Rural Telephone
131. Id. at 148.
132. Id. at 150 (citation omitted).
133. Id. at 167-68. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPY-
RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1967); Thomas B. Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion
or Reality?, 10 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 195 (1985).
134. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
135. Id.
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Service's directory consisted of a simple alphabetical list of the names of
Rural's subscribers, their towns, and their telephone numbers.136
Feist Publications, a publishing company making area-wide tele-
phone directories, paid for the rights to use listings from telephone com-
panies in eleven different service areas near Rural's service area. Rural
Telephone Service would not allow Feist to pay for the use of its
listings. m37
Because Rural would not allow Feist to license its listings, Feist
used them without Rural's consent. Feist removed several thousand geo-
graphically irrelevant listings, and then verified and attempted to obtain
additional information on the 4,935 remaining listings for use in its direc-
tory. Most of Rural's listings did not contain street addresses. Ulti-
mately, most of Feist's listings included names, street addresses, towns,
and telephone numbers. However, 1,309 of the 46,878 listings in Feist's
directory were taken directly from Rural Telephone Service's white
pages. Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement. 1
38
Feist conceded that the telephone book, as a whole, was copyright-
able but argued that the compilation of listings and individual listings
were not copyrightable.' 39 The Court's opinion is useful in defining the
scope of protection for works comprised of public domain information.
While the facts underlying a compilation cannot be protected by
copyright, the author can claim protection of the manner in which the
facts are presented. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be
original to the author. To be original, a work must: (1) be independently
created by the author, and (2) possess at least some minimal degree of
creativity.14°
Compilations of facts can be copyrightable if they possess the requi-
site originality: "The compilation author typically chooses which facts
to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected
data so that they may be used effectively by readers."'1
4 1
How much creativity is "at least some minimal degree of creativ-
ity"? The Court does not define a clear test other than to say that the
work must contain "some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble
or obvious' it might be";' 42 the work does not need to be novel, but can-
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1289.
142. Id. at 1287 (citation omitted).
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not be copied; 143 and the work must contain "the fruits of intellectual
labor., "
The Feist Court defined the minimal creativity requirement in terms
of what is insufficient: "works in which the creative spark is utterly lack-
ing or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent," '45 works that are "en-
tirely typical," "garden-variety, .... devoid of even the slightest trace of
creativity," '46 "could not be more obvious," and "firmly rooted in tradi-
tion and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of
course ... not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable."'147
Finally, when a compilation of public domain information is pro-
tected, the copyright is relatively "thin" and limited to the selection and
arrangement of such information. The Court in Feist explained that:
This protection is subject to an important limitation. The mere fact
that a work is copyrighted does not mean that every element of the
work may be protected. Originality remains the sine qua non of copy-
right; accordingly, copyright protection may extend only to those com-
ponents of a work that are original to the author.... Others may copy
the underlying facts from the publication, but not the precise words
used to present them ....
This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation
is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler re-
mains free to use the facts contained in an another's publication to aid
in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does not
feature the same selection and arrangement.... [T]he very same facts
and ideas may be divorced from the context imposed by the author,
and restated or reshuffled by second comers, even if the author was the
first to discover the facts or to propose the ideas. 148
Overall, the Feist Court makes clear that copyright rewards original-
ity, not effort. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors, but "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."' 1
49
Under Feist, trivial user interfaces will receive narrow protection,
and routine or commonplace approaches (such as simple menu selec-
tions) may receive no protection whatsoever. However, Feist reaffirms
that original, creative presentations of even public domain information
are protected by copyright.
143. Id. at 1287.
144. Id. at 1288 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
145. Id. at 1294 (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 1296.
147. Id. at 1297.
148. Id. at 1289 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 1290, citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; accord, Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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C. Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana
On January 27, 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the following question:
Whether the Mexican style appearance of a Mexican food restaurant
constitutes protectable intellectual property equivalent to a federally
registered trademark, even where the restaurant did not, and cannot,
show that its Mexican "look" has secondary meaning in the eyes of its
customers, so that members of the public associate the restaurant's ap-
pearance with that particular restaurant?15°
In Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana,'' the U.S. Supreme Court answered
this question in the affirmative and held that the "look" of a restaurant,
when inherently distinctive, and even though comprised of functional
(and therefore unprotectable) items such as furnishings and other lease-
hold improvements, is protected under the Lanham Act. More gener-
ally, when trade dress is inherently distinctive, it does not have to acquire
secondary meaning to be protected under the Lanham Act.'52
Taco Cabana operated a chain of restaurants in Texas serving Mexi-
can food. It described its Mexican trade dress as:
[A] festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas
decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The pa-
tio includes interior and exterior areas with the interior patio capable
of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage doors.
The stepped exterior of the building is a festive and vivid color scheme
using top border paint and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas
continue the theme. 153
About seven years after the first Taco Cabana restaurant opened in
San Antonio, a Two Pesos restaurant opened in Houston with a very
similar motif. Within one year, Taco Cabana's market had expanded
enough so that the markets of the two chains of restaurants overlapped in
several cities. Taco Cabana sued Two Pesos for trade dress infringement.
"The 'trade dress' of a product is essentially its total image and
overall appearance .... It involves the total image of a product and may
include features such as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture,
graphics, or even particular sales techniques. ' '
150. Taco Cabana Int'l v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1991), af'd, 112 S. Ct.
2753 (1992).
151. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
152. "To establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the
public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the
product rather than the product itself." Id. at 2756 n.4 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982)).
153. Id. at 2755 (citation omitted).
154. Id. at 2755 n. I (citing John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980
(11 th Cir. 1983)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. a (Tent. Draft
No. 2 1990).
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We believe that the Taco Cabana holding may be employed by
software authors and software publishers to obtain additional protection
for the "look and feel" of computer software. 15 5 Such protection will
arise when nonfunctional features of a software product are presented in
an inherently distinctive way. Such features are subject to trade dress
protection under the Lanham Act upon proof of a likelihood of confu-
sion. Such protection extends without proof of access and without proof
of copying (though both may be present as they were in Taco Cabana).
The open question is whether federal courts will apply in the Lanham
Act area similar tests for "functionality" as the courts have applied in
determining "idea" or "expression" under the Copyright Act. Ulti-
mately, original, creative, and distinctive user interfaces may be pro-
tected by both bodies of federal law.
IV
Conclusion
Developers of pioneering software products will continue to seek
broad protection of all aspects of their originality and creativity. Com-
petitors will continue to seek to exploit all unpatented functionality, in-
cluding methods of operation, user learned techniques, and data
compatibility. Each new product-indeed, with software, each new ver-
sion-presents a new set of facts upon which questions of scope of legal
protection and extent of infringement must be examined and re-ex-
amined. Though "look and feel" has been attacked by the defense bar,
we submit that copyright and Lanham Act protection will remain avail-
able for protecting the originality and creativity expressed by software
designers and programmers in the user interfaces of their computer
software products.
155. The issue is, to some degree, before the Ninth Circuit in Brown Bag Software v. Sy-
mantec Corp. ("Brown Bag II"). On remand, the district court ruled that it had intended for
all of Brown Bag's claims, including its trade dress claims, to be covered when it granted
Symantec's motion for summary judgment. Brown Bag appealed the district court's opinion
on the trade dress claims to the Ninth Circuit in December 1992.
In its opening brief filed March 17, 1993, Brown Bag argued that this is a case of first
impression for the Ninth Circuit, because the court has not considered whether trade dress law
covers the "look and feel" of computer software user interfaces. Citing Two Pesos v. Taco
Cabana, Brown Bag argued that trade dress protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
should extend to protect portions of computer programs that are not protectable by patents or
copyrights.
In its brief filed April 17, 1993, Symantec argues that Brown Bag is using the same evi-
dence it used for its copyright claims recast as evidence for its trade dress claims. Symantec
claims that Brown Bag is attempting to convince the Ninth Circuit that "the law of trade dress
should take back what, after due balancing, the law of copyright has given to the public,"
Symantec Brief at 29, in the form of unprotected elements of Brown Bag's PC-Outline user
interface.
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